Fourth Review Conference
of the Parties to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.IV/DC/1/Add.3(C)
13 September 1990

Original: ENGLISH

II.B. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Article VII

9. The Conference expresses its satisfaction at the continued successful operation of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) which is the cornerstone of a non-discriminatory régime prohibiting the testing, use, manufacture, production, or acquisition or the receipt, storage, installation or deployment of nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. It urges the Latin American States that are eligible to become parties to the Treaty to do so at an early date, an important step to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty in the region, and it reaffirms the repeated exhortations of the United Nations General Assembly to France, which is already a signatory of Additional Protocol 1, to ratify that Protocol. The Conference welcomes the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol 2 to this Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States.

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12. The Conference considers that the development of a nuclear weapon capability by South Africa at any time frustrates the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa and that collaboration with South Africa in this area would undermine the credibility and the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. South Africa is called upon to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All States Parties directly concerned are urged to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa. The nuclear-weapon States are invited to assist the efforts of States to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa, and to enter into binding undertakings to respect strictly the status of such a zone and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

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16. The Conference considers that the unsafeguarded nuclear capability of Israel complicates the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East as well as the stability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. The Conference calls upon Israel to submit all its nuclear installations and facilities to IAEA safeguards and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference also calls on the other non-NPT parties in the region to accede to the Treaty as soon as practicable. The application of IAEA safeguards to their respective nuclear activities would, as a confidence-building measure, contribute to reducing tension and promoting peace and security through ensuring the total absence of nuclear weapons in the region and will greatly facilitate the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in it.

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II.B. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE TREATY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Articles I and II and preambular paragraphs 1-3

1. The Conference reaffirms that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty plays a vital role in promoting regional and international peace and security. The Conference therefore welcomes the accession of further Parties to the NPT since the last Review Conference and urges all States not Party to the Treaty to accede to it. The Conference remains convinced that full compliance of all Parties to and universal adherence with the Treaty are the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices to additional States.

2. The Conference also reaffirms its determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear-weapons States Parties to the Treaty. Such proliferation would add immeasurably to regional and international tensions. It would increase the risk of nuclear war and lessen the security of all States.

3. The Conference reiterates the concerns and reaffirms the convictions expressed in preambular paragraphs 1 to 3 and agrees they remain valid. The Conference welcomes the positive developments in the international situation since the last Review Conference, especially in the East-West context and in the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Conference expresses the expectation that this tendency, contributing to lessening the danger of nuclear war, will be strengthened and become worldwide. The States Parties to the Treaty agree that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, in order to avoid the devastation that a nuclear war would bring. They remain convinced that any proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously increase the danger of nuclear war.

4. The Conference agrees that the strict observance of the terms of articles I and II remains central to achieving the shared objectives of preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to peace and security, including to the peace and security of non-Parties.

5. The Conference acknowledges the declarations by nuclear-weapons States Party to the Treaty that they had fulfilled their obligations under article 1. The Conference further acknowledges the declarations that non-nuclear weapons States Party to the Treaty had fulfilled their obligations under article II. The Conference underlines the vital need for all Parties to comply scrupulously and unreservedly in their activities with their obligations under the Treaty thereby not undermining the confidence of other States Parties in the security offered by their commitment to the Treaty.

6. The Conference notes with satisfaction the joint declaration of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic (document NPT/CONF.IV/28) by which they reaffirm their contractual and unilateral undertaking not to manufacture, possess or have control over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and by which they declare that the united Germany, too, will abide by this obligation, that rights and obligations under the instruments of the Treaty of 1 July 1968 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will continue to apply to the united Germany, and that the united Germany will seek the continued validity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 and that it supports the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

7. The Conference expresses deep concern that the national nuclear programmes of some States non-Party to the Treaty in various parts of the world may lead them to obtain a nuclear weapon capability. The Conference affirms the determination to stop the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities, and hence the ability to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The Conference therefore underlines the need for all States Parties to ensure that they do not assist, directly or indirectly, such nuclear programmes. States Party to the Treaty reiterate that any further detonation of a nuclear explosive device by any non-nuclear-weapon State would constitute a most serious breach of the non-proliferation objective.

8. (Text to be added.)